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MODERN SLAVERY AND THE SUPPLY CHAIN: THE LIMITS OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY? 
 
Purpose  
This conceptual paper examines modern slavery in the supply chain, showing how the issue challenges 
conventional thinking and practice in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
 Design/methodology/approach  
The paper considers the differences between modern slavery and other concerns within CSR. It examines legal 
attempts to encourage supply chain transparency and the use of corporate CSR methods. An example of 
forced labour in UK agriculture is used to develop a critique of these approaches. The paper examines the 
challenges facing research in this important area. 
Findings  
The paper shows that the distinctive characteristics of modern slavery may make conventional supply chain 
CSR practices relatively ineffective. A holistic perspective may be needed in future research. 
Research implications  
Researchers need to focus less on the espoused policies of individual corporations, and more on the enacted 
practice of industries and societies.  
Social implications  
Modern slavery is universally accepted as a shameful blight on society; firms’ supply chain practices may be 
part of the problem. 
Originality/value 
The paper’s contribution is to point to the potential differences between Modern Slavery and other CSR-
related issues, and to highlight the paradox that firms’ approaches to the issue may run in parallel with actions 
that foster the problem in the first place. 
 
--- <>---<> --- 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Supply chain research has blossomed in the last twenty years, and a part of this has been a growing awareness 
of the need for research to deal with the broader social and ethical implications of business practice (Gereffi  
and Lee 2012). New (1997) argued that researchers have an obligation to take the wider view, and also to 
draw on a wide range of research traditions. As supply chain management – in its broader sense – has such 
wide ramifications, it is imperative that researchers’ perspectives are not narrowed by artificial academic silos. 
This paper provides an exploration of an issue that brings that argument into sharp focus; it examines how the 
particular case of modern slavery presents some serious challenges to some conventional understandings of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The central research questions are: what is distinctive about modern 
slavery as an issue, and to what extent does it provide a ‘limiting case’ to mainstream CSR? The argument will 
be developed that modern slavery should be seen not merely as an exogenous problem which firms have a 
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responsibility to address, but as an endemic feature of the socio-economic systems which is in part constituted 
by firms themselves. As this argument is made, the paper raises wider questions about the intellectual and 
social obligations of academic research.  
This conceptual paper is structured as follows. The discussion begins with an overview of the phenomenon of 
modern slavery in the supply chain, and then proceeds to examine the literature on what makes the issue 
different from, and potentially more problematic than, other aspects of CSR. Two of the main responses to 
modern slavery in the chain are then examined. A particular illustration (from UK agriculture) is used to 
develop a critique of these approaches. Finally, conclusions are drawn about the future of research in this 
domain.  
MODERN SLAVERY IN THE CHAIN 
The question of forced labour in the supply chain has been the subject of much recent concern; examples 
include the Thai seafood industry (Hodal et al 2014; Sylwester 2014) and the Malaysian electronics sector 
(Verité 2014). Estimates of the scale of the problem vary, but there is consensus that it is a significant 
challenge for buying firms, presenting both ethical and reputational challenges (Noble 2014; Economist 2015). 
Many firms have well-established procedures and mechanisms for applying a range of methods to seek to 
maintain ethical and environmental standards in the chain (Green et al 1996; New 2004a), but how well do 
these methods match up to the challenges of modern slavery? And does the extant theory of forced labour 
provide a sound basis for further research? 
Modern slavery is the term used to describe a range of exploitative practices, and there is widespread 
agreement on the general definition, if not on the precise boundaries, of the term (Allain 2012; Crane 2013; 
RNLPS 2012). Modern slavery is often taken to include, for example, victims of sex trafficking and domestic 
servitude, but in this article I will concentrate on the elements of modern slavery associated with forced labour 
within a supply chain. The ILO (2005) has identified six indicators of forced labour: threats or actual physical 
harm to the worker; restriction of movement and confinement (to the workplace or to a limited area); debt 
bondage, where the worker works to pay off a debt or loan, and is not paid for his or her services; withholding 
of wages or excessive wage reductions that violate previously made  agreements; retention of passports and 
identity documents so that the worker cannot leave or prove his/her identity and status;  threat of 
denunciation to the authorities, where the worker is in an irregular immigration status. 
This definition differentiates modern slavery from previous models of servitude, such as possessive (chattel) 
slavery in ante-bellum North America or in the ancient world, which included legally sanctioned ownership of 
people. Nowadays there are no countries in the world in which such old-style slavery is legal; slavery is 
prohibited by Article Four of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), and is always a criminal 
activity. The scale of modern slavery is extremely difficult to verify, but although estimates vary, there is a 
broad consensus that such exploitation is widespread. Press coverage of the issue is sometimes confused by 
confounding of the issue with other related problems, such as people trafficking, organised sexual exploitation, 
child labour and prison labour,  and discussion is also complicated by rolling forced labour together with 
general concerns about working conditions, or indeed with the idea of all workers in industrial capitalism as 
being ‘wage slaves’. An example of this last point is illustrated by arguments (particularly in the Marxist 
literature) about conceptual and empirical distinctions between ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ labour (see Banaji 2003 and 
Brass 2003; see also Craven and Hay 1994; Steinfeld 2001). 
The research literature addressing modern slavery from a supply chain perspective is relatively limited 
(Quarshie and Salmi 2014), but Gold et al (2015) provide an extensive overview. They discuss the sectors in 
which the problem is particularly apparent, and present an overview of the challenges facing firms who may 
detect forced labour in their chain.  
The issue of working practices in the extended supply chain is frequently seen as part of the broad 
sustainability agenda (Gladwin et al 1995; McGoldrick 1996; Pagell and Wu 2009; Beske and Seuring 2014), and 
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in practice the operationalization of supply chain ethics is often conducted in parallel with the application of 
environmental supply chain policies; indeed, in some firms, it is the same people who cover both sets of 
responsibilities (Rasche et al 2013; Epstein and Rejc Buhovac 2014). Both agendas entail understanding the 
operations of supplying firms, typically beyond the first tier, and often involve processes of certification and 
audit. There are many similarities in how firms deal with suppliers’ environmental compliance and, for 
example, compliance with workplace health and safety. But the question of forced labour may be different in 
important ways: indeed, the tools which may be appropriate for thinking about general working conditions or 
other parts of the sustainability agenda may be entirely inappropriate.  In this paper I develop a conceptual 
framework for highlighting the possible differences, and – drawing on several recent developments – present a 
series of challenges for both practice and research. 
For firms dealing with their supply base, the prohibition of forced labour is a standard element in codes of 
conduct and statements of ethical practice (Bartley 2007). The issue sits alongside a range of other criteria (for 
example, compliance with local labour laws, freedom of association, systems for health and safety, and 
environmental compliance). In general, firms declare that they are against forced labour and forbid their 
suppliers from using it, and in many cases assert that this prohibition be cascaded down the chain of 
production. But what makes this particular issue different from other aspects of supply chain ethics? 
MODERN SLAVERY AND ‘NORMAL’ CSR 
The connection between CSR (and the overlapping issue of sustainability) and supply chain management has 
received extensive attention in the literature, and there is a substantial body of accumulated theory 
(Miemczyk et al 2012). For example, Beske and Seuring (2014) examine how firms’ approaches can be 
understood at the levels of strategic values, structure and processes. Pagell and Wu (2009) emphasise the 
importance of the former of these. Gimenez and Tachizawa (2012) comment on the way in which firms’ tend 
to divide their efforts between two main approaches: ‘assessment’ (seeking information from suppliers and 
setting standards) and ‘collaboration’ and direct engagement (for example, through supplier development). 
Both these approaches have limitations (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014).  Sancha et al (205) observe that 
that although supplier development activities in regard to social issues may have positive effects on suppliers’ 
social performance, there may not be a corresponding financial payoff for the buying firm. 
Although there is an enormous body of literature on modern slavery from a variety of historical, philosophical 
and social scientific perspectives, management scholarship has broadly neglected the issue of forced labour, 
with the notable exception of the work of Crane (2013). He presents a detailed and insightful model which 
shows how modern slavery’s  continued existence presents a theoretical challenge to institutional theory, 
illustrating how “…illegitimate practices can persist over time in the interstices of prevailing regulative, 
normative, and cultural-cognitive systems” (63). He argues that that to understand the phenomenon, it is 
necessary to make sense of both the cultural and socio-economic context, and the capabilities within the 
system for ‘exploiting and insulating’ and ‘sustaining and shaping’ the activity.  In other words, his model sets 
out to explain why modern slavery - being counter to the main institutional forces at play in contemporary 
societies – is possible. Crane identifies a variety of conditions in which modern slavery is likely to emerge: 
smaller businesses with limited ability to capture value, a disadvantaged population, geographic isolation and 
so on.  Crane’s observations about the liminality of forced labour provide the conceptual backdrop for the 
observations that follow, examining some of the ways in which modern slavery contrasts with other concerns 
in CSR and sustainability. 
Contract employment as part of the chain. 
Supply chain management is often concerned with the flow of physical materials that move from one place – 
or one party – to another. When considering a firm’s supply base, it is often the case that some suppliers are 
not considered important because that which they provide does not enter as a principal component in a 
product. For example, in discussions of the automotive industry, it is often the case that suppliers of electricity, 
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or Enterprise Resource Planning Software, or office consumables, would be considered in a different (and less 
significant) category than the suppliers of components that become part of the vehicle. Much supply chain 
literature – and CSR and supply chain literature – assumes that firms should concentrate on ‘strategic 
suppliers’ (Kraljic 1983), although recent work Pagell et al (2010) and Haake and Seuring (2009) has shown this 
is not what does or should happen in practice.  
When considering modern slavery and forced labour, the key elements of the chain are ones that superficially 
could be omitted from the ‘supply chain’, as they are often suppliers of workers – contract employment 
agencies, gangmasters – rather than suppliers of products (Plant 2008; Barrientos 2008). These third parties 
provide workers who may work for a firm without being direct employees, although to a casual observer they 
may be indistinguishable. As Barrientos (2008) points out, contract workers are sometimes not directly 
covered by corporate codes of practice, which may take advantage of the potential ambiguity of the terms 
‘supplier’ and ‘employee’. So, for example, forced labour may have a relatively lower visibility than other CSR 
issues that arise in the conventional material ‘chain’.  
Illegality 
For many issues in supply chain ethics and sustainability, firms’ codes of practice specify standards of conduct 
which constitute a type of private regulation – what those codes say represent a private rule which the firm is 
at liberty to specify, and police as it sees fit. Such codes generally specify that supplying firms should follow 
local laws, but may also go beyond local legal standards (Bartley 2005; 2007; Vogel 2008). When supplying 
firms fail to meet the standards, the buying firms have to the choice to cease trading with the supplier, or – 
more commonly – work on a plan to bring non-compliances up to standard. So, for example, if a supplying firm 
is in breach of local regulations on the administration of overtime pay or factory ventilation standards, a 
typical response is one of Voice rather than Exit (Goebel et al 2012). Indeed, for many other issues – including 
complex challenges such as child labour – buying firms can make an ethically grounded argument that 
continued engagement and gradual improvement is preferable for all concerned. Rather than simply 
automatically delisting suppliers when some breach is found, the idea is to pursue progressive upgrading. 
Although forced labour shares some features with other forms of malpractice, its unambiguous criminality and 
severity mean that in many cases issuing an ‘improvement notice’ is not a realistic option. If a buying firm 
uncovers forced labour in its supply chain, it is the discovery of serious criminality, and firms have unequivocal 
moral obligations (and, in some cases, potential legal obligations – see Phillips and Lin 2009) to bring the 
situation to the attention of the authorities. In nearly all such situations firms face the need to cease the 
commercial relationship with the guilty party with great urgency, even if at great cost to the business. Forced 
labour is an issue of such legal gravity that continued, knowing engagement could constitute direct complicity 
in criminal behaviour, a much more serious situation for the firm than ‘mere’ reputational damage (although 
this is also a significant factor). Individuals within a buying firm could find themselves in legal jeopardy: 
questions of ‘who knew what, when’ become important. In this way, the issue of forced labour requires a type 
of alertness and engagement that is somewhat at odds with the routine, bureaucratized administration of 
conventional supply chain assurance and certification schemes. 
Criminals 
Another distinctive feature of forced labour is that it involves not only criminal acts, but people who are 
prepared to perpetrate crime deliberately. In other words, no-one uses forced labour accidentally, or through 
negligence or ignorance. Forced labour is the result of deliberate actions by people prepared to bad things, 
normally including violence. This raises serious dangers for those who wish to investigate work situations in 
which forced labour may be present; because such criminals face potentially long custodial sentences if 
successfully prosecuted, the stakes are high, as are the risks to everyone involved. Put bluntly, staff from a 
buying organising who poke about in potentially dubious situations face the risk of putting themselves – and, 
potentially, their families, say – in harm’s way. If they take action, they risk recrimination. This sounds rather 
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melodramatic, but it should be remembered that the criminal gangs involved with people trafficking and 
forced labour often operate internationally and may be expected to already engaged in violence, bribery and – 
if threatened – to act to protect their own interests.  
Opacity 
One of the key issues in regard to forced labour is its potential invisibility and the difficulty of detection. The 
firm is likely to encounter very significant levels of active deceit and denial from anyone involved in forced 
labour, and so normal use of auditing and certification mechanisms is likely to be problematic. Additionally, 
Simas et al (2014) point out that forced labour often occurs in a transient, episodic way; it may not reflect the 
stability of the conventional employment relationship and so identification is harder. In Datta and Bales’ (2013) 
terms, forced labour is more of a process than an event. Furthermore, the victims of forced labour generally 
have considerable incentives to avoid contact with authorities (for example, because of fears about 
deportation, or fear of retribution) and may even been bound to their situation by more complex psychological 
and social ties (Bales 2002). This dimension may suggest that the types of approach used for some areas of 
supply chain monitoring (questionnaires, pre-notified audit visits) may not be suitable – or, indeed, pointless – 
for the investigation of forced labour. 
RESPONSES  
I now move on to a discussion of two responses to this issue, and consider some issues that arise from them. 
Legislating for Transparency 
This legislation (California Transparency in Supply Chains Act [S.B. 657], State of California, 2010), enacted in 
2011 and in effect from 2012, requires large firms in retail and manufacturing (i.e. those with annual 
worldwide gross receipts larger than $100 million and annual Californian sales larger than $500,000) to make 
public declaration of their efforts towards eradicating human trafficking and slavery from its supply chain, and 
to publish the information on their websites. Specifically, the disclosure must indicate the extent to which the 
retailer does the following: verifying product supply chains to evaluate risks; conduct supplier audits; requires 
direct suppliers to certify that materials are produced in accordance with antislavery legislation in relevant 
countries; maintains internal accountability procedures in respect of employees or contractors who fail to 
meet company standards; and, provide training for employees and management (Pickles and Zhu 2013). 
This legislation followed extensive debate about problems of human trafficking in the State, and was 
supported by a coalition of campaigning groups. It was opposed by an alliance of business groups (including 
the California Chamber of Commerce, California Grocers Association, California Manufacturers and Technology 
Association, and the California Retailers Association) who argued that it would place costly and unrealistic 
burdens on commerce. However, the proponents of the bill pointed out that the legislation did not require 
firms to make policies, but simply to report what, if anything, they had voluntarily done. The purpose of the 
legislation was to increase the ability of consumers to (in the words of the State Governor, Arnold 
Schwarzenegger) “…make better, more informed choices and motivate businesses to ensure humane practices 
throughout the supply chain” (McGreevy 2010).  The logic is that consumers can use the information to 
exercise ethical shopping – preferring those with better policies – and the NGOs and politicians can use 
‘shame’ to steer organizations to better practice. This general approach partially resonates with arguments 
made by academics and consultants (including the current author) about the value of transparency (New 2009; 
2010), and is embodied in proposals in the US to extend the policy nationwide (under the proposed Business 
Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act 2014; see US Congress 2014; Eckert 2013). In the UK, 
similar provisions have been included in the 2015 Modern Slavery Act (UK Government 2015). The general 
approach is also found in respect of conflict minerals in the relevant sections of the US Dodd-Frank Financial 
Reform Act (US SEC 2014).  
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Four main criticisms can be made in regard to the California Act. The first is a general disquiet at the possibility 
that the passing of responsibility to corporate actors for such significant issues in fact represents a retreat of 
the state from its proper role. For example, Sarfaty (2015:16) comments:  
“What is unique here is that the state is deploying multinational companies to regulate 
themselves and indirectly regulate other firms in their supply chain. Compliance by companies 
is thus linked to compliance by their suppliers. As a result, companies are responsible for 
implementing and enforcing regulatory standards on firms abroad, on behalf of the state.” 
Secondly, the notion of exactly which suppliers should be covered by firms policies and actions is not at all 
clear; what counts as a ‘supply chain’ is not at all obvious, and the reification of the concept in practice may 
serve a number of competing agendas (New 2004b). Further, as Sarfaty (2015) points out, drawing on the work 
of Gary Gereffi (Gereffi et al 2005), global value chains are fluid, and may change at a rate which makes some 
types of policy inoperable. 
The third criticism is that firms’ policies may be both highly uniform and very weak – in the sense that they rely 
on certification and audit systems that are unlikely to have much substantive value in the face of modern 
slavery. A good example of this is the SB 657 statement by Dunkin’ Donuts, which is broadly representative of 
firms’ stated policies: 
 “We screen suppliers on many business related criteria as well as their compliance with matters 
of law.  We seek partners that comply with government regulations, including those concerning 
human ethics.  Our suppliers are required to acknowledge, and agree to, our Supplier Code of 
Conduct. 
 “We conduct periodic on-site, announced and unannounced, visits to our manufacturing and 
distribution facilities around the globe, during which our employees, third party auditors and 
other designated associates inspect facilities and observe conditions, workers and practices as 
well as the suppliers compliance with our supplier Quality management systems, supplier Code 
of Conduct or contract terms, as applicable. 
 “We maintain accountability standards, including a Code of Conduct for our employees and a 
supplier Code of Conduct for our suppliers.  If we determine that our employees or suppliers are 
engaged in slavery or human trafficking, our employees will be disciplined, up to and including 
termination, and our supplier relationships terminated. 
 “All of our employees who are involved in supplier management are trained annually on 
administering our supplier Code of Conduct.  In addition, all employees participate in an annual 
employee Code of Conduct training.” (Dunkin Donuts 2014) 
 
It is transparency of a sort, but a transparency that actually reveals very little information, matching what 
Coombs and Holladay (2013) describe as a ‘pseudo-panopticon’. Furthermore, given what is known about the 
success of supply chain auditing, these policy statements seem unlikely to be particularly effective. Even in 
regard to less challenging supply chain CSR and environmental issues, it is common for the conventional policy 
and monitoring regime to be considered ‘broken’ (Sethi 2010; Donaldson 2014), providing extensive scope for 
manipulation and game-playing (Locke et al 2007; Parella 2014). Locke (2013) goes on to elaborate on the idea 
that such approaches may even displace other activities (for example, mundane process improvements) which 
might have a greater effect on working conditions. 
Fourthly, the idea of informing consumer choice or using ‘shame’ to drive firms’ behaviour doesn’t always 
work. Consumers may be too indifferent to the issue to respond to firms’ statements. However flimsy Dunkin’ 
Donuts measures may appear, it is interesting to note the comparison with the equivalent SB 657 statement 
by the Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc: 
 “We do not engage in verification of product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of 
human trafficking and slavery, nor conduct audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance 
with company standards against trafficking and slavery in supply chains. 
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 “We do not require direct suppliers to certify that materials incorporated into the product 
comply with the laws regarding slavery and human trafficking of the country or countries in 
which they are doing business. 
 “We do not maintain internal accountability standards and procedures for employees or 
contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking nor do we 
provide company employees and management, who have direct responsibility for supply chain 
management, training on human trafficking and slavery, particularly with respect to 
mitigating risks within the supply chains of products.” (Krispy Kreme 2014, emphasis added).  
 
The contrast between these statements is clear, but there is no evidence that Krispy Kreme approach has had 
any negative effect for the firm; one activist website (https://www.knowthechain.org/) has mentioned it, but 
otherwise there appears to be no negative response whatsoever in social media or news reports. Krispy Kreme 
has experienced no measurable impact on sales, nor suffered on any measure of corporate reputation. It is not 
clear why Krispy Kreme have adopted this particular stance, but the fact it can do so with (up to this point) 
impunity undermines some of the assumptions which have driven the push to legislation. In a recent move, a 
consumer has filed a class action suit against the US retailer Costco Wholesale Corporation (and several of its 
suppliers), claiming that the presence of forced labour in its seafood supply chain contravenes the statements 
made on under the provisions of the Supply Chain Transparency Act (Rathke 2015); it is too soon to say if the 
action is likely to make any legal headway (it seems unlikely) but it is interesting to note that Costco would 
have been less vulnerable to such a claim had it adopted a Krispy Kreme-style statement. 
At the time of writing, the UK government is considering exactly how to implement its version of the 
Californian Act’s ‘transparency’ statement: New (2015) warns of the risk of poorly specified requirements 
fostering a norm of empty, airy statements that mean nothing.  
CSR ‘Best Practice’: The Walk Free Approach 
In parallel with developments in legislation and regulation, recent years have seen considerable growth in non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) related to modern slavery and human trafficking: there are many groups 
tackling this problem, and there is a degree of visible competition between groups in making claims (Coyne 
2013; O’Connell Davidson 2014). Perhaps the most striking new initiative has been the launch of the Walk Free 
Foundation (www.walkfree.org), founded by Andrew Forrest, the Chairman of Fortescue Metals Group. The 
organisation has achieved an extraordinary degree of press coverage with the publication of the Global Slavery 
Index (http://www.globalslaveryindex.org/), providing country level estimates for the number of slaves around 
the world. Furthermore, it has managed to secure public endorsements from, among others, Pope Francis, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, to Richard Branson (Milman 2014).   
In late 2014 the initiative published an extensive handbook entitled “Tackling Modern Slavery in Supply Chains: 
A Guide 1.0”, in conjunction with the UK’s Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply and the ethical 
sourcing campaigning group Vertité. The 63 page ‘toolkit’ document describes itself as “a comprehensive 
system of meaningful action”, and presents a well-written and intelligent collection of best practice 
suggestions for firms seeking to avoid modern slavery in their supply chains. These include guidance on 
formulating policy statements, communicating strategy, conducting risk assessments for supplier selection, 
managing audits and on-site assessments, taking corrective action, and building continuous improvement with 
suppliers. The document draws on material produced by other groups and government agencies, making 
excellent use of (sometimes disguised) examples. Although much of the material is similar to that published by 
others, the document serves as an illustration par excellence of a corporate approach to modern slavery that is 
based around routinized CSR best practice. It is difficult to find fault with any particular element, and difficult 
not to imagine that if firms were to follow the guidance presented, the world would be a much better place. 
The thrust of the work is certainly in line with the idea of ‘best practice’ which could be transmitted 
throughout the extended chain (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009; Ayuso et al 2013) 
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However, the document is also interesting in terms of what it does not say. For example, it does not ask 
questions about the social or political conditions that give rise to vulnerable, precarious labour in the first 
place: the advice presented frames modern slavery as an evil which is exogenous to the corporations, and not 
as something that might be connected with the underpinning economic systems which support the ‘good’ 
firms. The report does not consider how the actions of the buying firms – for example, relentless cost cutting 
and the exercise of brutal commercial power - might stimulate supplying firms to feel the need to engage in, or 
turn a blind eye to, exploitative labour practices in the first place. There is also no discussion of how the people 
who are the victims of forced labour and modern slavery might be empowered to move beyond passive 
victimhood. 
Interesting parallels can be drawn here with other criticisms of the ‘modern slavery’ activism, in particular 
feminist critiques of anti-sex trafficking campaigns. For example, Bernstein (2014) describes the way in which 
some – perhaps well-meaning – campaigns about sex-trafficking tend to focus more on the melodrama of 
victimhood than rectifying the economic conditions which deprive women of choices; furthermore concerns 
about slaves and trafficking can be a convenient mask for other agendas such as border control, the 
application of particular kinds of sexual morality, and “policing the domestic underclass”. Similar thoughts 
arise in relation to the ‘rescue rhetoric’ which appears to play a role in some religiously-motivated anti-
trafficking activity (Choi-Fitzpatrick 2014), and in the way in which public concern about the issue leads to a 
‘heroic’ position: because slavery is such an evil, my highly publicised stand against it is assurance of my moral 
value (Haynes 2014; Steele and Shores 2014). On the other hand, my public concern about these people might 
be inconsistent with my disdain for those same people, if they happen not to fit neatly with my model of 
‘victim’. Writing about the UK’s Modern Slavery Act, O’Connell Davidson (2014: 31) comments on the 
inconsistency between apparent concern for migrants caught up in forced labour, with the often harsh 
treatments of immigrants in general. Simmons (2014) develops some similar arguments in respect of the 
‘marginalized other’ in human rights law.  
The parallels with forced labour in the supply chain as constructed with the Walk Free Foundation approach 
are clear. Efforts to emphasise the gravity of the suffering can end up presenting a model of victimhood that 
diverts attention from the possible causes; the concern extends to those that can be heroically rescued, but 
not those that are merely exploited. The ‘hero’ rhetoric, means that firms taking (even ineffectual) action can 
bask in a moral superiority. Indeed, it could be cynically suggested that the ‘walking away’ going on is firms 
walking away from a serious engagement with the social consequences of their own practices.  
UK Vegetable Production 
Developing this last point, I now consider the role of major firms in the supply chain, taking as an example the 
way in which major UK supermarkets source vegetables from UK suppliers. The setting is interesting because, 
unlike many of the examples from developing economies, it is impossible to interpret the story as reflecting 
some transitional, emergent stage towards ‘proper’ capitalism, or as resulting from some lack of sophisticated 
institutional and legal infrastructure.  
Grocery retailing in the UK is highly concentrated, and the power of supermarkets over the supply base has 
been an issue of continued concern for many years; there have been several attempts at codes of practice to 
contain supermarkets’ behaviour, and various inquiries have been undertaken. The findings have been 
universally consistent: despite a rhetoric of partnership and collaboration, suppliers have consistently reported 
‘a culture of fear’ (Economist 2007), with suppliers being faced with relentless pressure for price cuts and 
‘bullying’ (Fearne et al 2005; Blythman 2010; Simms 2007). There is little evidence in practice of the 
harmonious relationships proposed by some normative models and seen in some other settings (for example 
Fischer 2013). The UK’s Competition Commission (2008:6) found “…the transfer of excessive risk and 
unexpected costs by grocery retailers to their suppliers through various supply chain practices…” In 2013, 
Tesco’s CEO made a public commitment to a new deal for its British agricultural suppliers (Rayner 2013). In 
2014, Tesco’s continuing malpractice towards suppliers formed the basis of a financial scandal which led to the 
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resignation of the same CEO. UK farmers have complained about being crushed to the point of desperation by 
the behaviour of the supermarkets; extra charges may be levied, prior contracts swept away, and payments 
delayed – and even after the long sequence of bad publicity during 2014, in early 2015 the firm was reported 
as continuing with its aggressive mode of supplier relations (Williams 2015). However, although Tesco has 
received particular opprobrium in the media, all the main supermarket chains have received similar criticism 
(Butler 2015). The central issue here is that supply chains are channels of power (Cox 1999), in many cases 
characterised by extraordinary degrees of asymmetry (Holmlund and Kock 1996; Johnsen and Ford 2008). In 
consequence, food suppliers – and here the focus is particularly on UK vegetable production – have found the 
commercial environment increasingly challenging. One response to this has been the progressive substitution 
of UK domestic agricultural labour with cheaper and more compliant migrant labour. 
This sets the context for briefly reviewing the facts about a recent case in Cambridgeshire in the UK, one of the 
main regions for vegetable production. The area has become the home to a very large number of migrants 
from Eastern Europe, particularly those from the ‘A8’ states (Poland, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and Estonia: see McCollum and Findlay 2015). One town, Wisbech, has for example 
a population of 30,000, of whom 10,000 are new migrants from Eastern Europe (Gentlemen 2014). A local 
multi-agency investigation called Operation Pheasant identified 19 cases involving allegations of human 
trafficking and over 200 involving alleged cases of illegal gangmaster activity. By the end of the year this 
resulted in the ‘rescue’ of over 80 people from exploitative labour arrangements, the revocation of five 
gangmasters licences, with two illegal gangmasters being jailed and one of the revoked licence holders 
receiving a suspended prison sentence (Fisher 2014). The extensive press coverage of the operation and its 
outcome revealed the distressing and intimidating conditions in which the workers were operating. Most were 
involved in leek production, and after a series of arrests one of the local suppliers reverted to directly 
employing labour rather than via labour agencies (Sturdy and Fox 2014). The leeks being harvested were 
destined for sale in UK supermarkets, but from the available reports it is not possible to determine which 
chains (although Taylor and Sturdy 2014 suggest a shortlist of possible customers: Marks and Spencer, 
Waitrose, Asda and the East of England Co-Op).  
To put the story into perspective, it should be remembered that the large UK supermarkets have very well 
developed CSR programmes, and indeed have publically worked with many initiatives designed to eliminate 
bad practice, including collaborations with the UK’s regulatory and enforcement agency for forced labour in 
agriculture, the Gangmasters Licencing Authority (www.gla.gov.uk). Additionally, stories of this type of 
exploitation within UK agriculture are not new (for example, Kosviner 2003 provides an account with many 
parallels from eleven years earlier). It appears that the police action in Operation Pheasant was stimulated by 
general concerns raised by the local council and a general investigation by a government agency into the 
conditions of migrant workers in the region, rather than being prompted by information from supermarkets 
(Migration Advisory Committee 2014). This suggests that the supply chain auditing and inspection regime and 
the normal CSR machinery of supplier questionnaires and policy statements were – at least in this case – 
ineffective.  
The inclusion of Waitrose as one of the potential customers is interesting here, particularly in the light of 
Spence and Bourlakis’s (2009) discussion of Waitrose’s system of supply chain monitoring and control; a 
system which in which higher risk organizations are required to be subject to independent ethical audit, but at 
their own cost. Even here, the commercial power of the supermarkets means a transfer of value to them, away 
from the supplier. Furthermore, all of the supermarkets to whom the produce would have been directed have 
well-established and well-articulated anti-forced labour policies; all would have no trouble in complying with 
the requirements of US or UK transparency legislation. Overall, the case provides a compelling illustration of 
the logic of Crane’s model; at least in part, it is the supermarkets’ conduct which gives rise to the desperate 
economic conditions that in turn provide a context of increased likelihood of modern slavery. Whereas Gold et 
al (2015) suggest that oligopolistic industry structures appear to have advantages in tackling modern slavery 
(because large, sophisticated customers can exercise power to get suppliers to improve behaviour), this case 
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suggests that the opposite may be the case. Large oligopolistic customers can drive suppliers to the point at 
which terrible labour practices become an operating necessity. 
DISCUSSION  
From a theoretical perspective, this analysis presents an interesting twist to Crane’s model, which in part is an 
attempt to show how the ‘dysfunctional’ institutional form of modern slavery exists/persists in the interstices 
of the dominant modes of ‘proper’ organizations. In contrast, this analysis suggests that the phenomenon of 
forced labour, rather than being some kind of aberration, is something that is naturally generated by the 
normal system, a point that resonates with older arguments about the place of historical slavery in industrial 
capitalism. Indeed, it could be that the standard initiatives of anti-modern slavery CSR are themselves, in some 
senses, part of the enabling mechanisms for modern slavery to persist: the right hand (the CSR activity, the 
policy statements) gives the appearance of working to reduce the problem; the left hand (the brutal exercise 
of commercial power, hard negotiation on prices and trading terms) generate the conditions in which forced 
labour emerges. This applies (slightly against the thrust of Crane’s model) not only to distant suppliers in 
remote geographies with specific cultural conditions, but with local suppliers in a developed economy. 
For practice and policy, the implications are sobering. Slightly improving on legislation (such as the California 
Act, or The UK Modern Slavery Act), or developing an even slicker ‘Tackling Modern Slavery 2.0’, are – sadly - 
unlikely to lead to much progress. This is not to say that there is no virtue in these efforts; there is, however, a 
need for realism about what such approaches are likely to achieve. This adds weight to the arguments which of 
Beske and Seuring (2014) about the need for corporate values; however, what this may mean more than 
simple ‘proactivity’, but a profound reappraisal of fundamental business models. Furthermore, issues raised 
here mean that firms’ strategic choices go beyond simply seeking to pursue either assessment or collaboration 
(Gimenez and Tachizawa 2012) in respect of conventional CSR. In the case of UK supermarkets, either strategy 
is unlikely to deal with the fundamental problem of the imbalance of power between the parties in the chain. 
Despite this gloomy conclusion, two possibilities present themselves as ways forward, and these have 
relevance for firms, states and researchers. 
The first could be to take ‘transparency’ more literally, and to force firms to provide greater levels of detail 
about the exact provenance of their products, and to make specific data available as a public good. Some firms 
have taken modest steps in this direction (New 2009; 2010), although practice is highly variable between 
industries and firms (Marshall et al 2015). Some writers have been vocal in arguing that movement in this 
direction is vital Henriques (2007; Tapscott and Ticoll 2012); Jeff Swartz, former CEO of Timberland 
commented on the transparency of Apple:  
“Apple …remains tight-lipped about its supply chain – presumably prescribing to the belief 
that that supply chain secrecy is key to competitiveness.  It’s an argument that sounds 
vaguely familiar: in the last decade, some in the fashion industry pleaded the same 
argument with activists.  The outcome?  These days everyone knows where Nike and 
Timberland and Adidas manufacture —names, addresses—and the “competitive secret” 
argument is debunked.  Period.” (Ratcliffe 2011).  
This approach to transparency means that firms throughout the chain might be required to place in the public 
domain data which hitherto has been largely been understood to be commercially confidential. However, this 
shift has to be seen in the context of a broader democratization of knowledge brought made possible by the 
Internet (Goldman 1999; Sanger 2007; Fuchs and Sandoval 2013). Duff (2011) presents an argument which 
classifies information into three categories: ‘A’, to which every citizen has an equal right; ‘B’, in which 
inequalities in social distribution are permissible if particular conditions are met; and ‘C’, information for which 
distribution can be left to market forces (in other words, treated as private property). In the historical 
development of modern business, successive changes in regulation have shifted categories of information 
from ‘C’ to ‘B’ and from ‘B’ to ‘A’; companies financial reporting has become progressively more 
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comprehensive. In parallel, institutional developments and technological ability have meant that firms now 
reveal (relatively) large amounts of data on their operations (Cousins and Sikka 1993).  It is possible to imagine 
that information about supply chain provenance could similarly shift towards the public domain.  
For this new openness to have any consequence, however, there needs to be a commensurate effort from 
citizens, academics and activists to actually engage with the data that is made available. The idea of ‘shaming’ 
companies into better practice is a fairly weak instrument for improving practices, but it is possibly the best 
available (Jacquet 2015). However, this means work and courage; challenging firms on their practices is not 
straight-forward, as the odds are stacked in favour of powerful organisations (Crouch 2013; Corporate Reform 
Collective 2014). However, as Donaghey et al (2014), there is (at least theoretical) hope that a developing 
interaction between consumer power and labour rights might work towards substantive change. 
The second possibility is that states act to control the power of corporations directly through regulation and 
intervention. Although substantial action in this vein may appear unlikely in the current political climate in 
most parts of the world, there are historical precedents (for example in the US actions to diminish the power 
of oil and steel industries in the early twentieth century (Wells 2002); in nearly all prior cases, however, the 
logic of reducing the power of companies has been to protect consumers rather than workers.  
For researchers, the consequences of the preceding arguments are profound. New (1997) argued the need for 
researchers to take a broader perspective than that of the company when considering supply chain issues, 
considering the wider ‘system of provision’ (Fine and Leopold 1993). This means that researchers must engage 
with the broader social and ethical context of the phenomena under investigation. This is not at all straight-
forward, as it means that substantive research requires more and different data than that typically collected by 
‘supply chain management’ research. In particular, it means that empirical work may need more sources of 
information than the corporations themselves can provide. It also implies that the interaction between the 
scholar and the firms with whom they work acquires a grittier, more complex character; in too many cases, 
supply chain research can be seen to be uncritical and passive, and – especially in regards to supply chain CSR – 
insufficiently sceptical. 
In many cases, it suits firms to promote a story about modern slavery in which it is seen as minor aberration 
generated by a criminal fringe at the edges of the industrial system. Such a story provides an opportunity for 
firms to show off their CSR credentials, and academics can be complicit (for example, in case studies) in a 
process in which firms engage in a mild form of competition for perceived ethical merit. If, however, the bad 
practices in the chain are in fact consequences of firms’ policies and structures and power, then the challenge 
for research is more substantial (the data is harder to collect, the questions are harder to frame) and firms are 
less likely to be enthusiastic to collaborate with or fund the work. Researchers need to focus less on the 
espoused policies of corporations, and more on the enacted practice. Furthermore, standard methodologies – 
and even the standard format of academic papers - may not be up to the task of taking the wider view. It could 
even be necessary for researchers to adopt some of the approaches of investigative journalism.  
CONCLUSION  
In this paper I have set out a series of issues relating to forced labour in the chain, and identified several 
reasons why conventional CSR approaches may not be capable of addressing the problem. Although laudable 
in intent, the California Act has demonstrable weaknesses. The Walk Free approach – despite its merits – may 
be guilty of providing a set of tools which give the appearance of firms taking coherent action, but which may 
play into a narrative in which firms deploy largely ineffectual policies in a way which deflects attention from 
the underlying causes which leads to the problems in the first place. In the last part of the discussion, I use an 
example which might suggest that in the case of UK supermarkets, it is the exercise of their own commercial 
policies that foster a situation which their anti-slavery policies fail.  
Supply chains which produce great results for companies and consumers may be dazzling in their levels of 
technical sophistication, but fundamentally corrupt: we, as beneficiaries of such systems, are complicit in the 
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corruption.  Those with an understanding of the industrial system, and presume to teach others about it, have 
a special obligation to raise uncomfortable questions. The sociologist Keith Grint writes: 
“Slavery, the worst form of all work, is not perpetuated by acts of individual deviants who 
promote it, but by the passivity of those who could collectively stop it…Enslavement is 
essentially dependent on enthralment; ridding others of the former requires us to escape the 
latter” (2005: 383).  
13 | P a g e  
 
 
REFERENCES1 
Allain, J. (ed.). (2012). The Legal Understanding of Slavery: From the Historical to the Contemporary. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Andersen, M., and Skjoett-Larsen, T. (2009). “Corporate social responsibility in global supply chains.” Supply 
Chain Management: An International Journal, 14/2: 75-86. 
Ayuso, S., Roca, M., and Colomé, R. (2013). “SMEs as ‘transmitters’ of CSR requirements in the supply chain.” 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 18/5: 497-508. 
Bales, K. (2002). “The social psychology of modern slavery.” Scientific American, 286/4: 80-88. 
Banaji, J. (2003), “The fictions of free labour, contract, coercion, and so-called unfree labour”, Historical 
Materialism, 11/3: 69-95 
Barrientos, S. (2008). “Contract labour: the ‘Achilles heel’ of corporate codes in commercial value chains.” 
Development and Change, 39/6: 977-990. 
Bartley, T. (2005). “Corporate accountability and the privatization of labor standards: struggles over codes of 
conduct in the apparel industry.” Research in Political Sociology, 14: 211-44. 
Bartley, T. (2007). “Institutional emergence in an era of globalization: the rise of transnational private 
regulation of labor and environmental conditions.” American Journal of Sociology, 113/2: 297-351. 
Bernstein , E. (2014). “Militarized humanitarianism meets carceral feminism: the politics of sex, rights, and 
freedom in contemporary antitrafficking campaigns.” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society , 36/1: 
45-71. 
Beske, P. and Seuring, S. (2014). “Putting sustainability into supply chain management”, Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, 19/3: 322 - 331 
Blythman, J. (2010). Shopped: The Shocking Power of British Supermarkets. (Revised edition). London: Harper.  
Brass, T. (2003). “Why unfree labour is not ‘so-called’: the fictions of Jairus Banaji.” The Journal of Peasant 
Studies, 31:1, 101-136 
Butler, S. (2015). “Watchdog to examine retail supply relationships.” The Guardian, 29
th
 May, 26. 
Choi-Fitzpatrick, A. (2014). “To seek and save the lost: human trafficking and salvation schemas among 
American evangelicals”. European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 1/2: 119-140. 
Competition Commission (UK). (2008). The Supply of Groceries in the UK Market Investigation. London: 
Competition Commission.  http://www.ias.org.uk/uploads/pdf/Price%20docs/538.pdf. 
Coombs, W.T. and Holladay, S.J. (2013). “The pseudo-panopticon: the illusion created by CSR-related 
transparency and the internet.” Corporate Communication: An International Journal. 18/2: 212-227. 
Cousins, J. and Sikka, P. (1993). “Accounting for change: facilitating power and accountability.” Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 4/1:53-72. 
Coyne, C. (2013). Doing Bad by Doing Good: Why Humanitarian Action Fails. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.  
Corporate Reform Collective (2014). Fighting Corporate Abuse. London: Pluto Press. 
                                                                
 
1
 All internet links valid as at 2
nd
 June 2015. 
14 | P a g e  
 
 
Cox, A. (1999). “Power, value and supply chain management.” Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal. 4/4: 167-175. 
Crane, A. (2013). “Modern slavery as a management practice: exploring the conditions and capabilities for 
human exploitation.” Academy of Management Review, 38/1: 45-69. 
Craven, P., & Hay, D. (1994). The criminalization of ‘free’labour: Master and servant in comparative 
perspective. Slavery and Abolition, 15(2), 71-101. 
Crouch, C. (2013). Making Capitalism Fit for Society. Cambridge: Polity. 
Datta, M. N., and Bales, K. (2013). “Slavery in Europe: part 1, estimating the dark figure.” Human Rights 
Quarterly, 35/4: 817-829. 
Donaldson, T. (2014). “Bangladesh resetting the bar on compliance standards.” Sourcing Journal. October 3, 
2014. https://www.sourcingjournalonline.com/bangladesh-resetting-bar-compliance-standards.  
Donaghey, J., Reinecke, J., Niforou, C., and Lawson, B. (2014). “From employment relations to consumption 
relations: balancing labor governance in global supply chains.” Human Resource Management, 53/2: 229-252. 
Duff, A. S. (2011). “The Rawls‐Tawney theorem and the digital divide in postindustrial society.” Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science and Technology, 62/3: 604-612. 
Dunkin’ Donuts IP Holder LLC (2014). Online Services Terms of Use. 
http://www.dunkindonuts.com/content/dunkindonuts/en/help/terms.html#californiasupply 
Eckert, S. (2013). “The Business Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act: fighting forced labour in complex 
global supply chains.” Journal of International Business and Law, 12/2: Article 17. 
Economist (2007). “Shopped by their suppliers.” The Economist, 1st September. 22. 
Economist (2015). “Everywhere in (supply) chains. The Economist, 14
th
 March. 36. 
Epstein, M.J. and Rejc Buhovac, A. (2014). Making Sustainability Work: Best Practices in Managing and 
Measuring Corporate Social, Environmental, and Economic Impacts. New York:  Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Fearne, A., Duffy, R. and Hornibrook, S. (2005). “Justice in UK supermarket buyer–supplier relationships.” 
International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, 33/8: 570–82. 
Fisher, M. (2014). “Duo convicted of crop picker exploitation.” Fresh Produce Journal, 19th December. 
http://www.fruitnet.com/fpj/article/163749/duo-convicted-of-crop-picker-exploitation 
Fine, B. and Leopold, E. (1993). The World of Consumption. London: Routledge. 
Fischer, C. (2013). “Trust and communication in European agri-food chains.” Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, 18/2: 208-218. 
Fuchs, C., and Sandoval, M. (eds.). (2013). Critique, Social Media and the Information Society. London: 
Routledge. 
Gentlemen, A. (2014). “Wisbech: the end of the road for migrant workers.” The Guardian, October 8th.  
Gereffi, G., Humphrey, J., & Sturgeon, T. (2005). “The governance of global value chains.” Review of 
International Political Economy, 12/1: 78-104.  
Gereffi, G. and Lee,J. (2012). “Why the world suddenly cares about global supply chains.” Journal of Supply 
Chain Management,  48/3: 24-32. 
Gimenez, C. and  Tachizawa, E.M. (2012) "Extending sustainability to suppliers: a systematic literature review", 
Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 17/5: 531-543. 
15 | P a g e  
 
 
Gladwin, T.N., Kennelly, J.J. and Krause, T-S. (1995). “Shifting paradigms for sustainable development: 
implications for management theory and research.” Academy of Management Review, 20/4: 874-907.  
Goebel, P., Reuter, C., Pibernik, R., & Sichtmann, C. (2012). The influence of ethical culture on supplier 
selection in the context of sustainable sourcing. International Journal of Production Economics, 140(1), 7-17. 
Gold, S., Trautrims, A., and Trodd, Z. (2015). “Modern slavery challenges to supply chain management”. Supply 
Chain Management: An International Journal, 20/5. 
Goldman, A.I. (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Green, K., Morton, B. and New, S.J. (1996). “Purchasing and environmental management: interactions, policies 
and opportunities”. Business Strategy and the Environment. 5/1: 188-197 
Grint, K. (2005). The Sociology of Work. Cambridge: Polity. 
Haake, H. and Seuring, S. (2009). “Sustainable procurement of minor items–exploring limits to sustainability.” 
Sustainable Development 17/5: 284-294. 
Haynes, D. F. (2014). “The celebritization of human trafficking.” Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, 653/1: 25-45. 
Henriques, A. (2007). Corporate Truth: The Limits to Transparency. London: Earthscan. 
Hodal, K.,  Kelly, C. and Lawrence, F. (2014). “Revealed: Asian slave labour producing prawns for supermarkets 
in US, UK.” The Guardian, 10th June. http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2014/jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour 
Holmlund, M. and Kock, S. (1996), “Buyer-dominated relationships in a supply chain: a case study of four small 
sized suppliers”, International Small Business Journal, 15/1: 26-40. 
ILO (2005). A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour. Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Report of the Director-General. Geneva: International Labour 
Organization. 
Jacquet, J. (2015). Is Shame Necessary? New Uses for an Old Tool. New York: Penguin. 
Johnsen, R. E. and Ford, D. (2008). “Exploring the concept of asymmetry: A typology for analysing customer–
supplier relationships.” Industrial Marketing Management, 37/4: 471-483. 
Kosviner, T. (2003). “Britain's illegal farm workers.” Evening Standard. July 3rd. 
http://www.standard.co.uk/news/britains-illegal-farm-workers-7234582.html 
Kraljic, P. (1983). “Purchasing must become supply management.” Harvard Business Review, 61/5: 109-117. 
Krispy Kreme (2014). “S.B. 657 Supply Chains Act”.  
http://www.krispykreme.com/SharedContent/Media/FormsLib/supply_chains_act.pdf. Accessed 15th 
February 2015. 
Locke, R.M., Qin, F. and Brause, A. (2007) “Does monitoring improve labor standards? lessons from Nike.” 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 61/1: 3-31. 
Locke, R.M. (2013). The Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global Economy 
(Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lund-Thomsen, P. and Lindgreen, A. (2014). “Corporate social responsibility in global value chains: where are 
we now and where are we going?” Journal of Business Ethics, 123/1: 11-22. 
16 | P a g e  
 
 
Marshall, D., McCarthy, L., McCrath,P. and Harrigan, F. (2015). “Damned if you do damned if you don’t: 
Building a theory of supply chain information disclosure.” Paper presented at the Second International 
EurOMA Sustainable Operations and Supply Chain Forum, ESADE, Barcelona, March 23-24, 2015 
McCollum, D. and Findlay, A.M. (2015). “‘Flexible’ workers for ‘flexible’ jobs? The labour market function of A8 
migrant labour in the UK.” Work, Employment and Society. In press.  
McGoldrick, D. (1996). “Sustainable development and human rights: an integrated conception”. International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 45/4: 796-818. 
McGreevy, P. (2010). “Schwarzenegger signs anti-slavery bill.” Los Angeles Times, September 30th. 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/09/schwarzenegger-signs-anti-slavery-bill.html 
Miemczyk, J., Johnsen, T.E., and Macquet, M. (2012). “Sustainable purchasing and supply management: a 
structured literature review of definitions and measures at the dyad, chain and network levels”, Supply Chain 
Management: An International Journal, 17/5: 478 – 496. 
Migration Advisory Committee (2014). Migrants in low-skilled work. The Growth of EU and non-EU Labour in 
Low-Skilled Jobs and its Impact on the UK. London: Migration Advisory Committee. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/333083/MAC-
Migrants_in_low-skilled_work__Full_report_2014.pdf 
Milman, O. (2014). “Andrew Forrest signs up religious forces to fight slavery and trafficking.” The Guardian, 
March 18th. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/18/andrew-forrest-signs-up-
religious-forces-to-fight-slavery-and-trafficking 
New, S. J. (1997). “The scope of supply chain management research.” Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, 2/1: 15-22. 
New, S.J. (2004a). “The ethical supply chain”, In: Understanding Supply Chains: Concepts, Critiques and Futures. 
(New, S.J. and Westbrook, R., eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 253-280. 
New, S.J. (2004b). “Supply chains: Construction and legitimation”, In: Understanding Supply Chains: Concepts, 
Critiques and Futures. (New, S.J. and Westbrook, R., eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 69-108. 
New, S.J. (2009). “Supply chain traceability and product provenance: challenges for theory and practice.” In: 
Sweeney, E., (ed.) Supply Chain Management and Logistics in a Volatile Global Environment. Dublin: Blackhall 
Publishing Ltd. 89-98. 
New, S.J. (2010). “The Transparent Supply Chain.” Harvard Business Review, 28/10: 76-82. Reprinted in 
Harvard Business Review on Managing Supply Chains (2011), Harvard Business School Press. 21-32. 
New, S.J. (2015). The Transparency in Supply Chains Clause of the UK Modern Slavery Act (MSA): A Response 
to the Consultation (May 8, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605555 
Noble, D. (2014). “11% of UK businesses say slavery in their supply chains is 'likely'”. The Guardian,  18th 
August. http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/aug/18/11-of-uk-businesses-say-slavery-in-
their-supply-chains-is-likely. Accessed 10th February 2015. 
O’Connell Davidson, J. (2014). “The making of modern slavery:  Whose interests are served by the new 
abolitionism?” British Academy Review, 24: 28-31. 
Pagell, M. and Wu, Z. (2009). “Building a more complete theory of sustainable supply chain management using 
case studies of 10 exemplars.” Journal of Supply Chain Management, 45/2: 37-56. 
Pagell, M., Wu, Z., and Wasserman, M.E. (2010). “Thinking differently about purchasing portfolios: an 
assessment of sustainable sourcing.” Journal of Supply Chain Management, 46/1: 57-73. 
Parella, K. (2014). “Outsourcing Corporate Accountability.” Washington Law Review, 89, 747-1035. 
17 | P a g e  
 
 
Phillips, J. and Lin, S-J. (2009). “Their brothers’ keeper: global buyers and the legal duty to protect suppliers’ 
employees.” Rutgers Law Review, 61/2: 333-378. 
Pickles, J. and Zhu. S. (2013). The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act. Working Paper 15. Manchester: 
Capturing the Gains. Available at www.capturingthegains.org. 
Plant, R. (2008). “Forced labor: critical issues for US business leaders.” Paper prepared for conference on 
Engaging Business: Addressing Forced Labor, Atlanta, Georgia. Available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/empent/areas/business-helpdesk/faqs/WCMS_092176/lang--en/index.htm 
Quarshie, A. and Salmi, A. (2014). “CSR and ethics in supply networks: the case of human trafficking.” Paper 
presented to the 30th IMP Conference, September, Bordeaux, France. 
http://impgroup.org/uploads/papers/8274.pdf 
Rasche, A., De Bakker, F. G., and Moon, J. (2013). “Complete and partial organizing for corporate social 
responsibility.” Journal of Business Ethics, 115/4: 651-663. 
Ratcliffe, R. (2011). “Timberland CEO's tirade on Apple.” 
http://dev.imsplc.com/index.php/resources/blog/item/140-timberland-ceos-tirade-on-apple 
Rathke, S.K. (2015). “Litigation fallout from all this supply chain transparency legislation (or, these things have 
teeth!) (or, the cycle of misfortune).” National Law Review, August 27
th
. 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/litigation-fallout-all-supply-chain-transparency-legislation-or-these-
things-have#sthash.vRZ5M4o3.dpuf 
Rayner, J. (2013). “Cheap food, poor farms, public anger... so what is Tesco's Philip Clarke going to do about 
it?” The Guardian, 21st July. http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/21/philip-clarke-tesco-farmers-
interview-jay-rayner 
RNLPS (2012). Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery. Research Network on the Legal 
Parameters of Slavery. Available at: 
http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/HumanRightsCentre/Resources/Bellagio-
HarvardGuidelinesontheLegalParametersofSlavery/ 
Sancha, C., Gimenez, C., Sierra, V. and Kazeminia, A. (2015). “Does implementing social supplier development 
practices pay off?” Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 20/4: 389 – 403 
Sanger, L, (2007). “Who says we know: on the new politics of knowledge.” Edge: The Third Culture. 
http://edge.org/3rd_culture/sanger07/sanger07_index.html 
Sarfaty, G. A. (2014). “Shining light on global supply chains.” Harvard International Law Journal, Forthcoming. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512417. 
Sethi, P. (2010). “Corporate sustainability reporting: Tackling credibility and conflicts of interest.” Ethical 
Corporation. January. Available at:  http://www.ethicalcorp.com/communications-reporting/corporate-
sustainability-reporting-tackling-credibility-and-conflicts-inter 
Simas, M.S., Golsteijn, Huijbregts, Wood, R. and Hertwich, E.G. (2014). “The ‘bad labor’ footprint: quantifying 
the social impacts of globalisation.” Sustainability, 6: 7514-7540. 
Simms, A. (2007). Tescopoly: How One Shop Came Out on Top and Why it Matters. London: Constable.  
Simmons, W.P. (2014). Human Rights Law and the Marginalized Other. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Spence, L. and Bourlakis, M. (2009). “The evolution from corporate social responsibility to supply chain 
responsibility: the case of Waitrose.” Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 14/4: 291-302. 
18 | P a g e  
 
 
State of California (2010). Senate Bill No. 657:  California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010. 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/164934.pdf 
Steele, S. L., and Shores, T. (2014). “More than just a famous face: Exploring the rise of the celebrity expert-
advocate through anti-trafficking action by the Demi and Ashton Foundation.” Crime, Media, Culture, 10/3:, 
259-272. 
Sturdy, J. and Fox, N. (2014). “Is migrant exploitation still rife?”. BBC News website. 18th December. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-cambridgeshire-30418987. 
Sylwester, J. G. (2014). “Fishers of men: the neglected effects of environmental depletion on labor trafficking 
in the Thai fishing industry.” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 23: 423-460. 
Steinfeld, R.J. (2001). Coercion, Contract and Free Labour in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Tapscott, D. and Ticoll, D. (2012). The Naked Corporation: How the Age of Transparency Will Revolutionize 
Business. New York: Free Press. 
Taylor, J. and Sturdy, J. (2014). “Fens migrant workers 'exploited', BBC finds.” BBC News website. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-24108665 
UK Government (2015). Modern Slavery Act 2015. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted 
UN (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York: United Nations. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a4 
US SEC (2014). Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Washington: 
US Securities and Exchange Commission. http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml 
Verité (2014). Forced labor in the production of electronic goods in Malaysia: a comprehensive study of scope 
and characteristics. New York: Verité. http://www.verite.org/research/electronicsmalaysia 
Vogel, D. (2008). “Private global business regulation.” Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 261-282. 
Wells, W. (2002). Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Williams, C. (2015). “Tesco faces fresh accusations of 'bullying’ suppliers over price cuts.” Daily Telegraph, 8th 
February.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11399558/Tesco-faces-
fresh-accusations-of-bullying-suppliers-over-price-cuts.html 
 
 
